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Latchford: Proxy Wars & Sovereignty

Introduction
Proxy war has existed since the time of the Roman Empire. From the ByzantineSassanian Wars to the twenty-first century’s War on Terrorism, states have intervened in other
countries’ conflicts for centuries. However, involvement in proxy war opens vast ethical
considerations, from conduct to implications on the internal resources and the national security
interests of a state. Furthermore, proxy warfare can impact the sovereignty of both the warring
states and the countries “pulling the strings”; thus, it is necessary to evaluate and understand the
impact proxy war has on state sovereignty. This paper will seek to identify the impact of proxy
war on state sovereignty and evaluate the ethical viability of proxy warfare in relation to Just
War Theory through a cross-comparison of the Libyan and Yemen Civil Wars. However, to
determine the ethics of proxy war and its impact on sovereignty one must first define proxy war
and comprehend the factors separating a proxy conflict from traditional conflict.
Proxy War
Though it holds multiple interpretations, proxy war is commonly defined as a war
between regional states where each side has a supporting superpower supplying indirect military
intervention.1 For a conflict to be considered proxy, it must involve the intervention of another
state in the form of either arms deals and/or military support. This definition may also expand to
the direct intervention of other states in the conflict of two other warring nations, depending on
the extremity and duration of their direct involvement. This is highlighted by the Vietnam War,
wherein the United States never formally declared war yet provided troops and weapons to assist
the South Vietnamese in their efforts against the Soviet-backed Vietcong.2 For continuity, this
paper will utilize the terms “principal actor” to refer to superpowers contributing to a conflict
and “secondary actor” for countries influenced by a superpower’s indirect involvement and
support.
Proxy war differs from conventional war as the influencing principal actors do not
formally declare war on their adversaries; rather, states engage indirectly in combat to further
their interests.3 The key component of proxy warfare is the intervening state’s motivation to
preserve its national security interests.4 As a result of this motivation, proxy environments evolve
into conflicts fueled by external-state aspirations, consequently creating two models of proxy
conflict: the transactional and the exploitative models.5 The transactional model highlights the
mutual benefit consideration of proxy involvement, with both the principal actor and the
secondary actor state receiving benefits from their involvement. In contrast, the exploitative
model emphasizes the role of the intervening state, inferring that the principal actor serves as the
primary source of survival for the secondary actor, thus resulting in the intervening state holding
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unlimited influence over the actions of the intervened state.6 Through the exploitative model, the
relationship between proxy and superpower is temporal, dependent only on whether the proxy’s
conflict can advance the superpower’s objectives.7 An example of this model is the Russian
support of the Ukrainian Donbas region, as the separatist region is financed and politically
recognized by the Russian government to counter Ukrainian movements on Russia’s eastern
border.8 On the other hand, the transactional model emphasizes equal power between the proxy
and the principal actor, as the secondary actor’s goal is not to receive full support but simply to
acquire assistance in obtaining a common goal.9 This common interest allows for the proxy to
determine who they associate with, thus the proxy maintains its sovereignty and negates the
exploitative model’s emphasis on subjugation by the principal actor.
These two models of proxy war reveal the impact of proxy warfare on state sovereignty.
Sovereignty is crucial component of a government’s survival, as it establishes legitimation of
authority to represent national interest.10 The exploitative model highlights how proxy war can
undermine state sovereignty, as in this approach an internal state conflict is influenced by
external powers. Absolutized proxy war creates a scenario where a country no longer has
sovereignty over its actions or its ability to provide for its population, for the principal actor
holds significant leverage over the actions (or inactions) of the proxy state. Furthermore, proxy
war compromises the sovereignty of a state because it mitigates a state’s territorial integrity and
political authority.11
Ethics of Proxy Wars
To discern if a proxy war is justifiable, one must also determine the ethical components
of proxy conflict. To do so, the motivating features and subsequent effects of a proxy conflict
should be assessed. Proxy war generally involves a principal actor’s indirect support of a conflict
without declaring war or formally allying with the party they support. This indirect support may
result in arms deals and political support, thus further fueling the conflict and prolonging its
effects on the proxy’s stability and population. Consequently, proxy involvement can result in
more collateral damage to a population than an isolated conflict would.
Given these effects, it is possible to determine the ethics of proxy wars. The exploitative
model of proxy war aligns with Machiavellian ethics. Niccolò Machiavelli, an Italian
philosopher, emphasized the use of secular realist approaches to international relations to obtain
national security objectives. Machiavelli’s The Prince frames the use of contractual strategic
relationships between a principal actor and a secondary actor, with the principal actor
subcontracting warfighting to obtain their goals.12 This realist perspective affirms the existence
of the anarchical structure within international affairs and claims preemptive action can serve as
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a defensive protection for national power.13 With this perspective, it can be determined that
proxy war, while undesirable, is not unfathomable – so long as it pursues the protection and
obtainment of a state’s objectives. Historic and current events emphasize the use of proxy war as
a method to obtain national security objectives, as seen through the Libyan Civil War and the
current situation surrounding the state of Yemen’s civil war and humanitarian crisis.
Libyan Civil War
Though Libya has experienced several civil wars throughout its history, this paper will
focus primarily on the conflict that occurred from 2014 to 2020. The Second Libyan Civil War
began in 2014 with the launch of Operation Dignity by General Khalifa Haftar against the
General National Congress.14 The fragile state of the General National Congress and Libyan
government in 2014 is attributed to the death of dictator Muammar Gaddafi, whose passing
resulted in the downfall of his regime and consequently the institutional infrastructure of Libya,
providing ample room for rebels with varying objectives to fill the power vacuum left in
Gaddafi’s absence.15 Though there was a proposal for a government of national unity in 2015,
the lack of established sovereignty and authority of this government resulted in ISIS territorial
gains and escalated tribal conflict.16 Since Operation Dignity, the Government of National
Accord (GNA) and the Libyan National Army (LNA) have been at odds, with each seeking to
control the Libyan government. Throughout the conflict, outside forces sought to influence the
conflict through airstrikes, operational support, and political support.17 To identify the impacts of
the Second Libyan Civil War on the country’s autonomy, one must identify the actors in the
conflict and their respective interests. The actors involved in this conflict included the
Government of National Accord (GNA), the Libya National Army (LNA), Islamist militants,
Russia, and Turkey.
The primary actors in the Libyan Civil War were the GNA and LNA. Fundamental
differences between the two organizations instigated extensive party divides, and the initial
limited power of the LNA motivated their desire to shift the balance of power within Libya.18
The GNA was established in 2015 with the assistance of the United Nations to unify the Libyan
government’s rival administrations.19 The LNA, however, was led by General Khalifa Haftar,
whose disbandment of the General National Congress led to the Libyan Civil War. Though both
sides sought to hold full control of the Libyan government, each had differing ideas on the future
of Libya. Consequently, the relationships between both groups devolved into a conflict that
gained international attention. The LNA’s support system stemmed from international
involvement by Egypt, France, the United Arab Emirates, and Russia.20 International interest in
13
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this conflict stemmed from the conflict’s impacts on civilians and the importance of Libyan oil
fields to the global economy. Libya’s oil production accounted for approximately 347,200
exported barrels of crude oil per day at the tail-end of the civil war, making it one of the world’s
top exporters.21 Thus, the Libyan Civil War quickly was influenced by outside actors to prevent
Libya’s oil supply from being monopolized by another entity.
In addition to domestic actors, non-state actors impacted the trajectory of the Libyan
Civil War. Key non-state actors included al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), ISIS, and
Ansar al-Sharia. Throughout the conflict, Islamic militant groups sought to establish shari’a law
and influence politics in Libya to implement the caliphate.22 The most prominent of these
organizations was ISIS, who held control of a sizable portion of southern Libya and utilized
traditional terrorism methods to progress the conflict towards an end with Islam emerging as the
primary influencer on Libyan government and politics.23
Russian and Turkish involvement in the Libyan Civil War assisted in its qualification as a
proxy war. Russia’s support included arms trades and sending mercenary groups, such as the
Wagner Group, to provide tactical support to the LNA.24 In exchange for their economic and
military support of the LNA, Russia sought to secure oil deals in Libya to further its economic
enterprise.25 Furthermore, Russia’s support undermined the capabilities of International
Organizations (IOs) to intervene in matters of sovereignty. Russia’s position on the United
Nations (UN) Security Council forced the UN allowed the state to veto a vote to condemn the
LNA for their actions in Libya, consequently keeping the IO from making a formal statement on
the Libyan Civil War.
Similarly, Turkey’s involvement in the Libyan Civil War serves as an example of the
impact of proxy intervention within a conflict. Turkey’s support of the GNA in Libya manifested
in troops and arms trades, with Turkey providing more than one hundred officers, thousands of
militants, and shipments of drones to support the GNA in the conflict.26 Through its involvement
in the Libyan Civil War, Turkey held aspiration to reassert itself as a major player in the Eastern
Mediterranean region.27 This highlights the ability of proxy warfare to yield results, as Turkish
involvement within the war enabled the GNA to re-establish their boundaries and pursue
maritime activity to support its effort.28 Turkey’s proxy involvement in the Libyan Civil War
was integral in the GNA’s success, thus highlighting how proxy support can determine a conflict.
Yemen Civil War
The Yemen Civil War began in 2014 with the seizure of Sana’a by Houthi rebels. The
Houthi’s siege of Sana’a was inspired by the failures of Yemen’s transitional government to
establish lasting change after the Arab Spring.29 After the Houthis overtaking of Sana’a and exile
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), “Libya facts and figures,” OPEC Member
Countries, 2020.
22
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of President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, Saudi Arabia created a coalition of Middle Eastern and
Western countries, including Egypt, Bahrain, and the United States, to combat the Houthi
occupation.30 The motivation behind the Saudi coalition is attributed to the Houthi movement, as
the Houthis are a Shi’ite Islamic group backed by the Islamic Republic of Iran. As the civil war
progressed, the impact of foreign powers within the country’s conflict became increasingly
evident, thus evolving the conflict from a civil war to a proxy war between the Saudi-backed
Yemeni government and the Iranian-backed Houthi movement. To better comprehend the
sovereignty implications of the Yemen Civil War, it is imperative to identify and understand the
actors in the conflict. The primary actors identified in the Yemen Civil War include the Islamic
Republic of Iran, the Houthi rebels, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and the Yemeni
government.
The Islamic Republic of Iran is the main supporter of the Houthi rebels in Yemen due to
their mutual Shi’ite origin, their disdain for the Western world, Saudi Arabia’s Sunni Islamic
alignment, and their embracing of Western interaction.31 Through the Yemen Civil War, Iran can
indirectly oppose Western intervention in the Persian Gulf and simultaneously support another
Shi’ite group that has been labeled as terrorists by the West. Iran already opposes the West
through their support of Hezbollah in Lebanon and other groups who seek to destabilize the West
and empower the caliphate. However, Iran’s support of the Houthis in Yemen holds an additional
motivation for involvement. This motivation is Yemen’s proximity to a critical geopolitical
chokepoint: the Bab el-Mandeb strait. Should the Houthis gain control of Yemen, they would
have a direct link to the third-most active oil chokepoint in the world, as well as an avenue to
expand arms trafficking.32 Thus, the Yemen conflict serves as an opportunity for Iran to
simultaneously oppose Western society, impact global trade networks, and expand their
influence in the Arabian Peninsula without risking their own soldiers in a conflict.33
The Houthis are a Shi’ite rebel group based in Yemen that emerged in 2003 in light of the
US invasion of Iraq, which they opposed.34 Throughout the Arab Spring the Houthi movement
grew in popularity, particularly with Yemen’s younger population as it was seen to combat the
regime’s infrastructural tactics of repression.35 The Houthis gained substantial power in the
social arena after the events of the 2011 Arab Spring, which ousted Saleh’s government and
resulted in a transitional government.36 Despite the popular support of the Arab Spring and the
growing status of the Houthis within social spheres, the results of the Arab Spring in Yemen
paralleled the outcome of the Arab Spring in Egypt, where the transitional government resulted
in little positive change to the country’s constitution. This instigated further unrest and
animosity, resulting in the Houthi takeover of Sana’a. Today, the Houthi objective in Yemen
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remains the same: to establish an internationally recognized Houthi government in Yemen
through economic, military, and political victory.37
Saudi Arabia’s approach to the conflict is in stark contrast with Iran’s anti-Western
rhetoric. Saudi Arabia’s influence in the Arab Peninsula is unparalleled, as it holds the highest
GDP in the Persian Gulf38 and produces some of the highest numbers of crude oil exports in the
world.39 Considering the historical conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia in both political and
religious fronts, the Iranian support of the Houthis in Yemen and the possibility of Houthi
success pose threats to Saudi Arabian hegemony in the region. Consequently, Saudi Arabia’s
involvement in the conflict by leading an oppositional coalition and supporting the Yemen
government is now viewed more as a movement to combat Iran and secure their borders.
The United States has also established itself as a stakeholder in the Yemen conflict. The
United States, along with several other Western countries, joined the Saudi coalition to combat
the Houthis in 2015. US-Yemen relations are unstable at best, as highlighted by Yemen’s support
of Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in the Gulf War and its multiple coup attempts with
anti-Western sentiments.40 Despite this history, President Obama’s support of UN Resolution
2216 resulted in US involvement in the Yemen conflict via expressed support of the Yemeni
government in 2015. Additionally, the United States sought to impact the conflict due to its
counterterrorism objectives. The US saw that a failed Yemen would result in a power vacuum
that anti-Western actors would inevitably attempt to fill. Consequently, the US joined Saudi
Arabia in the conflict and aided via logistics, weapons trading and intelligence sharing.41
The Yemeni government also plays a critical role in this conflict. Although they have
been exiled in Saudi Arabia since 2014, Yemen’s government seeks to reestablish their control
over the country with the help of the Saudi coalition and other actors. However, this objective
has become increasingly difficult to obtain as the years have progressed. Since the conflict has
endured for so long, the costs have begun to outweigh the benefits for the Yemeni government’s
benefactors.42 With a stalemate in the peace process and the increased need for financial,
military, and political support for the Yemeni government, formerly involved parties such as
Morocco and the United States have begun to withdraw the conflict to preserve their resources
and pursue other national security objectives.43
The Yemen Civil War highlights the evaluated complications that arise from proxy
intervention for both the principal state and the secondary state. If the costs of intervention begin
to outweigh its benefits, principal states are able to rescind their support and resources easily
because of the indirect nature of the proxy cooperation. This withdrawal can diminish any form
of responsibility a state might have for the damage that their resources and intervention may
inflict on a state’s population, thus enabling the principal actor to avoid responsibility for
mistakes and humanitarian failures.
CSIS Briefs, “The Iranian and Houthi War against Saudi Arabia,” Center for Strategic & International
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38
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Additionally, the Yemeni government’s current situation highlights the impact of proxy
involvement on conflict progress. Although the war is ongoing ten years later, the motivation for
other nations to contribute and help has decreased, thus resulting in an exponentially decreased
level of support by the international community. For example, the Yemen Humanitarian Fund
created by the UN Crisis relief has received a lack of funding by other states as a result of the
ongoing (and seemingly never-ending) nature of the conflict.44 This emphasizes the impacts
proxy wars have not only on the internal politics of a country or the external interactions between
states, but also on the general livelihood and overall longevity of a nation. Furthermore, proxy
warfare in the context of the Yemen Civil War has immense potential to further conflict
progression. As Iran and Saudi Arabia continue to provide financial and military support to their
respective side, the conflict will continue to develop and grow in scale and in its overall impact
on the population. Arms and technology trade provides advantages over an opponent and opens
an avenue for continued conflict. Indirect involvement in proxy wars can result in an endless
supply of weaponry to one side, thus allowing the fight to continue until the other side eventually
runs out of resources or morale.
Just War Theory
In reviewing proxy wars ethical considerations, one must also evaluate the applicability
of Just War Theory to proxy warfare. Formulated by St. Augustine and outlined by Thomas
Aquinas, Just War Theory establishes the principles of an ethically justified war through the
three primary concepts: jus ad bellum (justice before war), jus in bello (justice in war), and jus
post bellum (justice after war). Though the principles of ethical conflict existed centuries prior to
Augustine or Aquinas, the formulation of Just War Theory emphasized Christian approaches to
armed conflict and peaceful resolution. Each concept of Just War Theory (ad bellum, in bello,
and post bellum) allows actors to determine whether a conflict is both valid and necessary and
outlines the obligations states have in combat.45 Jus ad bellum denotes that for a state to go to
war, it must have a just cause (i.e., acting in defense) and have pursued methods of peace prior to
declaring war on another state.46 Additionally, jus ad bellum asserts that a war must be declared
by a proper authority for an armed conflict to be justified.47 The nature of proxy warfare as an
undeclared war against a particular adversary creates a line of contention with Just War Theory,
as a country’s indirect support through political, economic, and military means constitutes
involvement without formal declaration. An intervening country must also consider the jus ad
bellum qualifications of the side which they support; the proxy power must also algin with the
criteria of jus ad bellum to solicit outside support of their cause.48 Further, the motivations for a
principal-actor’s involvement in a proxy war may not be categorized as defensive. The Libyan
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Civil War serves as an example of this, as Russia’s motivations to support the GNA was not for
defensive reasons but for offensive gain in oil trade.49
Though a state may enter a war under the requirements of jus ad bellum, this does not
ensure that a state will uphold the principles established by jus in bello in the conflict. Jus in
bello principles include proportionality and discrimination – the amount of force used in the
conflict and the state’s discernment of legitimate targets of war.50 Just War Theory’s foundations
in biblical principles are especially emphasized by jus in bello, as the book of Jeremiah
proclaims that a state should do what is right and just, to not wrong the innocent and to protect
the weak from unjust suffering.51 Because proxy war may include the use of non-state actors
(e.g., mercenaries, terrorist cells, etc.), it is increasingly difficult to maintain the principle of
discrimination. The lack of uniformed and established soldiers makes it nearly impossible to
distinguish between civilians and combatants. As a result, proxy war holds an increased risk of
civilian casualties, negating the principle of jus in bello within proxy war conflict. The principles
of proportionality and discernment not only apply to the conduct of the conflict, but also to the
conflict’s collateral damage as well. In terms of proxy warfare, collateral damage refers to the
conflict’s impact on livelihood and displacement. While the conflict is still ongoing, Yemen
serves as an unequivocal representation of proxy war’s collateral damage.
While the primary focus in proxy war is jus ad bellum and jus in bello, the third principle
jus post bellum is equally important. Jus post bellum refers to the responsibility of the victor to
ensure justice after victory and to establish peace. Although it is often overlooked in favor of jus
ad bellum and jus in bello, jus post bellum is critical for the longevity of peace in domestic and
international spheres. Without ensuring justice to both the victor and the conquered and giving
consideration of post-war environments, peace will not endure. The aftermath of World War I
emphasizes this point, as the Treaty of Versailles resulted in optimal gain for the victors and left
the conquered German state destitute, thus fueling an economic crisis and Hitler’s eventual rise
to power.52 In relation to this cross-comparison, the continued principal actor involvement in
Libya serves as an example of misguided jus post bellum. Though the Second Libyan Civil War
ended in October 2020 with a permanent ceasefire, principal actors continue to influence the
state and impact the domestic stability of Libya to this day. Turkey is actively engaged in Libyan
domestic affairs through thematic discourse, utilizing the ‘Blue Homeland doctrine’ to justify its
activism in the Eastern Mediterranean.53 Similarly, Russia remains involved in post-civil war
Libya by utilizing the Wagner group to support the LNA throughout key oil facilities in Libya.54
Furthermore, jus post bellum can be considered the restorative arm of Just War Theory,
as jus ad bellum and jus in bello focus on right intention while jus post bellum encompasses
reconciling action.55 Jus post bellum is especially relevant to proxy war conflict. Since injustice
Akram, Kharief, “Libya’s Proxy War: International Guns for Hire in post-Gaddafi Conflict,” Le Monde
Diplomatique, 2020.
50
Jeff McMahan, “Proportionality and Necessity in Jus in Bello,” In The Oxford Handbook of Ethics in
War, ed. Seth Lazar and Helen Frowe (New York, NY: Oxford University Pres), 2016.
51
Jeremiah 22:3, ESV.
52
Lousi V. Iasiello, Jus Post Bellum, Naval War College Review 57, no. 3 (2004).
53
M. Cüneyt Özşahin & Cenap Çakmak, “Between defeating “the warlord” and defending “the blue
homeland”: a discourse of legitimacy and security in Turkey’s Libya Policy,” Cambridge Review of International
Affairs, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2022.2089545.
54
Robert Uniacke, “Libya Could be Putin’s Trump Card,” Foreign Policy, 8 July 2022,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/08/wagner-group-libya-oil-russia-war/.
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after a war would result in further strife, a country involved in a proxy conflict cannot simply
leave when the fighting is done – they must ensure that the objectives they fought for will
withstand the test of time. Therefore, Just War Theory holds that a principal-actor in a proxy war
has an ethical responsibility to establish and maintain peace once the conflict is resolved, to
provide for its own goals and to ensure the implementation of justice in the aftermath.
Conclusion
Proxy warfare is a term which holds several definitions. From the transactional model to
the exploitative, the overarching component of proxy conflict is a superpower’s indirect support
to progress either an individual or mutual interest. The impacts of proxy war on individual state
sovereignty is exemplified in the Libyan and Yemen Civil Wars, wherein external support
shifted power dynamics from the parties in the conflict to the intervening states. Just War Theory
determines that proxy warfare is problematic under jus ad bellum and jus in bello qualifications;
however, should a country partake in a proxy war, they are ethically obligated to provide for jus
post bellum.
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